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INTRODUCTION
In today’s economy, public corporations are increasingly owned by
diversified shareholders. Yet these corporations continue to sue each other
all the time for breach of contract, patent infringement, theft of trade
secrets, and myriad other legal wrongs. Such lawsuits—in which
diversified shareholders essentially sue themselves—call into question the
standard academic theories of corporate liability. Those theories posit that
corporate liability serves to compensate victims and—by forcing
shareholders to bear the costs of their agents’ actions—to deter wrongdoing.
But the compensation rationale fails when those being compensated are also
paying the damages. And the deterrence rationale fails when the owners of
the injurer also own the victim, because then the injurer’s shareholders
internalize the costs of their agents’ actions regardless of whether a lawsuit
is brought.

*

Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. For helpful comments, we
would like to thank Margaret Blair, Stephen Choi, Paul Edelman, Merritt Fox, Michael Klausner, Evan
Lee, Susan Morse, Jason Rantanen, Jeffrey Schoenblum, Randall Thomas, William Wang, and
participants in workshops at Vanderbilt University Law School, New York University School of Law,
and Hastings College of the Law. We would like to dedicate this Essay to the memory of Richard
Nagareda, who gave the project early encouragement. He is sorely missed.
**

1679

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The puzzle of self-suing shareholders was first noticed in the context of
“fraud-on-the-market” class actions, in which shareholders try to collect
damages from their corporation for allegedly false statements by managers.
Critics argue that these lawsuits merely shift wealth from one shareholder
pocket to another, minus a hefty attorneys’ fee. Randall Thomas and James
Cox have countered this circularity critique with a reductio ad absurdum,
arguing that the same point could be made about any lawsuit between
companies owned by diversified shareholders.1 And yet, Thomas and Cox
assert, such firm-on-firm lawsuits must be socially valuable, albeit for
reasons they do not specify.2
In this Essay, we introduce a new theory of corporate liability—called
the “informational” theory—that seeks to explain why litigation between
publicly traded firms can in fact be socially valuable even when those firms
are owned by the same shareholders. We posit that such litigation makes
sense not in conventional terms of compensation and deterrence, but rather
in terms of the principal–agent conflict between diversified shareholders
and undiversified managers. In short, we show how “intraportfolio
litigation”—in which one firm in a diversified shareholder’s portfolio sues
another—can serve as a corporate governance tool. Intraportfolio litigation
can improve the quality of firm-specific financial data, making earnings
reports and stock prices better measures of the contribution of each firm’s
managers to overall portfolio value.
Our argument that intraportfolio lawsuits can make managers better
agents is related to the standard deterrence rationale for corporate liability,
except that we invert the normal way of thinking about means and
incentives. Existing theories of corporate liability assume that shareholders
have the means to discipline corporate agents but lack the incentive to do so
when the agents injure third parties. Under this account, corporate liability
supplies the missing incentive by forcing the shareholders, within the
confines of limited corporate liability, to bear the costs of their agents’
actions.
With respect to intraportfolio litigation, we make the reverse claim.
Diversified shareholders already have the incentive to prevent their agents
from imposing excessive costs on other corporations that the shareholders
own. What diversified shareholders lack are cost-effective means to act on
this incentive. Information deficits and collective action problems make it
uneconomical for shareholders to police managers’ behavior directly. All
the shareholders can do is encourage a manager to maximize her firm’s
1

James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A
Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L.
REV. 164, 177 (2009).
2
Id. Thomas and Cox argue that lawsuits among diversified shareholders vindicate an “important
principle,” though it is unclear whether this principle is something other than the simple right to sue. Id.
In Part V we revisit their reductio in the light of the theory of corporate liability that we develop.
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profits by, for example, tying her pay to the firm’s stock price. But this
motivational technique introduces a conflict of interest, as the manager
could inflate her firm’s reported profits through conduct that, by imposing
costs on other public firms, diminishes the overall value of the
shareholders’ portfolio. Allowing the injured firm to collect damages from
the injuring firm corrects the distortion that would otherwise appear in each
firm’s reported profits. Put another way, intraportfolio litigation makes it
easier for shareholders to evaluate and motivate their agents, because it
attributes costs that the shareholders already bear to the responsible
corporate managers.
We believe that this informational theory places a conceptual
foundation beneath a wide variety of civil lawsuits between public firms
with potentially overlapping owners—including contract actions, and tort
actions based on negligence or strict liability. There are limits, however, to
how much self-suing activity the theory can salvage. In particular, we
doubt it can justify the very category of lawsuits that started the circularity
debate in the first place: the securities fraud class action. For one thing, the
informational value of private securities lawsuits against public
corporations is low, both because the calculation of damages in such cases
overstates the actual injury to portfolio value, and because most corporate
fraud is already revealed through other sources. In addition, securities fraud
is likely to be well deterred by direct lawsuits against the responsible
managers, making corporate liability unnecessary. In these ways securities
fraud is different from other legal causes of action, which if directed solely
against corporate agents would either underdeter them (because, for
example, the responsible agents are judgment proof) or overdeter them
(because the actionable conduct also confers benefits on shareholders that
the agents do not internalize). We thus believe that the informational theory
rebuts the Thomas and Cox reductio ad absurdum, as it provides a
principled distinction between securities fraud class actions and other
potentially circular intercorporate lawsuits.
This Essay has five Parts. Part I surveys the traditional scholarly
justifications for corporate liability. Part II lays out the circularity critique
of corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market class actions. Part III extends
that critique to intercorporate litigation generally. Part IV explains how the
informational theory might justify corporate liability even in lawsuits
between firms owned by the same shareholders. Part V returns to the topic
of fraud-on-the-market class actions, and examines whether these actions
can be defended on informational grounds. In the Essay’s conclusion, we
extend its argument by briefly considering how a manager’s decision to
initiate an intraportfolio lawsuit can itself be a source of principal–agent
conflict.
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I. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
When a corporation is held liable for the acts of its agents, it is its
shareholders—within the constraints of limited shareholder liability—who
foot the bill. Corporate liability can arise through a variety of legal sources.
Like other employers, corporations face respondeat superior liability,
meaning that they are strictly liable for torts committed by their employees
acting within the scope of their employment.3 Corporations can also be
held liable for employee violations of statutes and regulations.4 And when a
corporate agent causes the corporation to breach a contract, it is the
corporation rather than the agent that the law holds accountable.5 Finally,
corporations can voluntarily assume their employees’ liability by promising
to indemnify them or by purchasing liability insurance coverage on their
behalf.6
Scholars have developed several theories to justify these forms of
liability, which we will refer to collectively as instances of “corporate
liability.” The theories fall into two general categories, which we describe
below.
A. Compensation
The most straightforward compensation rationales sound in notions of
fairness.7 It is unfair, the argument goes, for a person to bear a loss that is
someone else’s fault. When that someone else is a corporate employee who
was acting within the scope of his employment, it is fair that the corporation
should be required to make the victim whole, at least to the extent that the
relatively more culpable employee cannot. The employer defines the scope
of employment and hence is responsible for placing the employee in a
position to harm third parties.
Another compensation rationale identifies a risk-spreading or insurance
benefit in shifting losses from third-party victims to corporations.8 The

3

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 696 & n.22 (observing that “most courts of
appeal now hold that the common law doctrine of respondeat superior applies to securities fraud
actions” brought pursuant to federal law, and collecting cases).
5
See Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (“An individual who
signs a contract on behalf of the corporation is cloaked in the mantle of the enterprise and is not
personally liable for action taken in the corporate name.”).
6
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2010).
7
For a description and critical review of fairness justifications for enterprise liability, see Gary T.
Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1739, 1749–54 (1996).
8
For the classic treatment of this argument, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50–54 (1970). For a more recent discussion of the insurance
4
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presumption is that corporations are more efficient risk bearers than the
typical victim because they tend to have many shareholders9 and can more
easily buy insurance. Forcing the corporation to compensate the victim
spreads the loss from one person to many, which from a social perspective
makes the loss less onerous.
B. Deterrence
By far the best developed justifications for corporate liability focus on
its potential to increase social welfare by promoting the goal of optimal
deterrence. A legal system promotes this goal when it forces actors to bear
the full social costs of their conduct, thereby encouraging them to engage in
the conduct only if the total costs of doing so are outweighed by the
benefits.10 Deterrence arguments for corporate liability come in two
varieties. The first contends that corporate liability is necessary to prevent
underdeterrence in situations when employees are inadequately deterred by
personal liability. The second maintains that corporate liability is necessary
when employees might react too strongly to personal liability, refraining
from activity that imposes costs on third parties but that is nonetheless
socially worthwhile.
1. Underdeterrence: The Lawsuit-Resistant Employee.—It is natural
to assume that people without money will not heed the threat of monetary
sanctions. These so-called “judgment-proof” defendants are the most
widely cited justification for corporate liability.11 The argument is
straightforward: since many employees are judgment proof, holding
employers liable for employee conduct enhances deterrence by encouraging
justification for litigation generally, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2060–61 (2010).
9
See Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1996).
10
This result may be achieved if the law attaches a monetary sanction to behavior equal to its social
costs multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the sanction will be imposed, assuming wellinformed, risk-neutral, rational actors. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 483 (2004) (“Thus, if the harm is 100 and the probability of sanctions is 50 percent, the sanction
should be multiplied by 1/.5 = 2, so the sanction should equal 200 (and thus the expected sanction would
equal 100) . . . .”). On the other hand, society may deem the utility derived from certain categories of
activities to be illegitimate; the goal of sanctions targeted at such activities would be to deter them
altogether rather than to encourage would-be perpetrators to weigh social costs against personal benefits.
11
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 188–90 (7th ed. 2007); Arlen &
Carney, supra note 4, at 707; Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of
Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1981). Even a sanction that a person cannot fully pay should deter him
so long as the expected amount of liability he can pay is greater than the benefit he would derive from
the proscribed behavior. Thus, the problem of judgment-proof defendants is particularly likely to
undermine deterrence with respect to people who are poor or who have a great deal to gain from the
sanctionable conduct. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 703 (hypothesizing that corporate
officers are most likely to commit securities fraud when they perceive it as necessary to preserve their
jobs and their personal wealth that is tied to the value of their firm’s stock).
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the employers to take measures that limit the costs their employees impose
on third parties.12 An employer might screen applicants for their propensity
to take care, monitor employee conduct on the job, modify production
processes to reduce the likelihood of harm, or use pay and promotions to
reward prudence and punish recklessness.13 The employer also might
reduce activity levels to decrease the risk that its operations or products will
cause harm.14 In the absence of liability, the argument goes, employers
would lack incentive to invest in socially desirable deterrence efforts or to
scale back production to efficient levels. Indeed, employers might
encourage employee conduct that generates social costs in excess of social
benefits, so long as those costs are externalized to third parties.15
There are reasons beyond a lack of personal wealth why personal
liability for employees might be an inadequate deterrent. In some situations
it may be impossible for victims to discover or prove which particular
employees within a firm caused their injuries.16 To the extent they know of
this possibility, employees will discount the risk of personal liability
12

Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal
Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1362–63 (1982).
13
For discussions of these methods, see Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 702–03, 706 (1997);
Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569–70 (1988) [hereinafter
Sykes I]; Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1255–56 (1984)
[hereinafter Sykes II]. On the other hand, there may be situations where the employer can do nothing to
affect employee behavior, such as when the behavior is difficult to observe and the employee has no
interest in maintaining a long-term employment relationship. See Sykes II, supra, at 1247–52. In these
situations, respondeat superior liability might lead to worse behavior by employees. See Sykes I, supra,
at 570. Respondeat superior liability also may undermine deterrence if employer efforts to deter
employee misconduct increase the probability that the employee’s misconduct will be detected and
hence expose the employer to a greater risk of sanction. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 842–43 (1994).
14
The possibility that employers will adjust activity levels is a commonly cited reason why
vicarious liability is strict. See Sykes II, supra note 13, at 569. If such liability instead were duty-based,
employers might escape liability on grounds that they had invested in all cost-justified precautions, even
though the employer was producing at levels at which the marginal social value of output was less than
its marginal social costs. This argument for strict liability assumes that courts would not take production
levels into account when evaluating the employer’s standard of care. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at
198.
15
See, e.g., Sykes II, supra note 13, at 1241–42. This hazard is most likely to arise when the
victims do not have a contractual relationship with the employer. If they do—for example, if they are
customers or other employees of the firm—and if they have accurate information about the risks posed
by the firm’s operations, then demand for the firm’s output will fall or its labor costs will rise, causing
the firm to internalize the expected social costs of its employees’ conduct. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at
213.
16
See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1350 (explaining that placing liability on the employee alone
may result in too many accidents because injuries may “result from a complicated combination of acts
by various agents” that courts cannot untangle, thus allowing “many agents [to] escape liability because
the plaintiff cannot prove a particular agent was at fault”).
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accordingly. Placing liability on the employer might then be efficient
because the employer might take steps to prevent the injury from occurring
in the first place.17
Alternatively, employees might systematically
underestimate liability risk in a way that employers do not. This might
occur because the employees have less information than employers or are
more susceptible to behavioral biases.18 In such situations, holding
employers liable will increase deterrence toward efficient levels.19
2. Overdeterrence: The Lawsuit-Overreactive Employee.—While
some employees will underreact to personal liability, others will overreact.
And this too can be a justification for corporate liability. Overreaction to
liability can be a problem because some business activities impose costs on
third parties but nonetheless create social wealth. Factories that make
valuable products may pollute neighboring farmland. Contract breaches are
sometimes efficient even though the counterparty suffers a reliance cost.
When an employee decides, on his employer’s behalf, to build a factory or
breach a contract, most of the benefit goes to the employer in the form of
higher profits. This means that if the employee is held personally liable for
the costs of such decisions, he will face an asymmetric payoff function: the
expected cost of the decision to him might be greater than his expected
personal gain even though the decision creates wealth for society as a
whole. The employee will therefore be overdeterred.20 In the case of the
factory, he might spend more employer resources on pollution scrubbers
than is justified, or he might refuse to build the factory at all. In the case of

17

See id. at 1370. For liability against the employer to be justified on this basis, the plaintiff must,
as a legal matter, be able to hold the employer liable despite the plaintiff’s inability to hold anyone
within the firm individually responsible. This will not always be the case. For example, in securities
fraud litigation, courts have rejected the notion of “collective scienter,” instead requiring plaintiffs to
plead and prove that specific individuals acted with the requisite intent. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445
Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Brief of Appellant at 17); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d
702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1756 (identifying other weaknesses with
this rationale).
18
See Croley, supra note 9, at 1733–37; Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1373.
19
In addition to the deterrence measures available to employers that we have already discussed,
employers also might try to avoid liability by educating employees about true risk levels. See, e.g.,
Croley, supra note 9, at 1731. Importantly, the notion that vicarious liability will promote deterrence in
this context assumes that employers would be unable to shift the expected liability back onto employees
through indemnity actions, compensation practices, or otherwise. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note
13, at 852 (explaining that if corporations can shift liability back to employees without cost, “they will
not treat this liability as a cost, and thus vicarious liability will not induce firms to incur enforcement
expenditures”). Shifting liability back to employees may be infeasible due to transaction costs or
because the employees are judgment proof.
20
See Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1679, 1693 (1996) (observing that employees whom employers cannot cheaply monitor may
“overcomply” with legal standards when they face personal liability but can pass compliance costs on to
their employer).
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the contract, he might refuse to order a breach even though complying with
the contract is, from a social perspective, no longer worthwhile.
A second reason that personal liability might overdeter applies with
particular force to corporate agents. Legal liability is fraught with chance.
The whims of judges and juries, the happenstance of accidents, and the
natural limits of human self-control mean that even conscientious
employees cannot fully predetermine their future liability. This uncertainty
increases the deterrent effect of personal liability for employees who are
risk averse, as most are.21 Shareholders are naturally risk averse too, but
they can reduce much of their firm-specific risk by holding a diversified
investment portfolio.22 This means that, as a structural matter, diversified
shareholders will be less risk averse than their agents with respect to
liability for harms those agents cause. From their perspective, corporate
agents who face personal liability may therefore give too much weight to
liability risk when making decisions on the corporation’s behalf.
To overcome this overdeterrence problem, shareholders may want to
shield their agents from personal liability. We see here a justification for
the common law rule whereby an agent who causes his principal to breach a
contract is not held liable to the principal’s counterparty. And for those
areas of law in which employees are held liable, such as tort law, employers
often agree to shield them contractually.23 For example, Delaware
corporations are allowed to indemnify their managers and other employees
against personal liability so long as the agent was honestly seeking to
advance the corporation’s interests.24
Once, however, the employee is shielded from liability, he will be
lawsuit-resistant, much like someone who lacks personal wealth and thus
has nothing to lose in a civil suit. The employee might then cause his firm
to underinvest in pollution-reducing technologies or to breach contracts
whenever there is some personal advantage in doing so. For such an
employee, the underdeterrence justification for employer liability
reemerges. If the employer is held liable, then she (or, if a firm, its owners)
will have the incentive to utilize the various means at an employer’s

21

See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 225 (observing that uncertainty in the negligence
determination can cause risk-averse parties to be excessively careful).
22
See Sykes II, supra note 13, at 1235–36 (offering reasons why employers are likely to be less risk
averse than employees).
23
As an alternative to indemnification, an employer could purchase liability insurance on the
employee’s behalf. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984). Insurers are better risk- bearers than employers when the
employer is not owned by numerous diversified shareholders or is small enough that its liability risk
could render it insolvent and thereby generate the costs of financial distress.
24
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2010).
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disposal to prevent employees from engaging in socially wasteful conduct.25
When the employer indemnifies the employee, this transfer of liability
happens automatically. But even when no indemnification agreement is in
place, the employer may be held liable as a formal legal matter, either
directly (as in breach of contract cases) or vicariously (as in tort and
criminal cases). In either situation, the employer internalizes the costs of
the employee’s conduct. And because the employer also typically receives
the benefits of that conduct, she will be more likely to strike the wealthmaximizing balance between encouraging employees to engage in
productive activity and preventing them from injuring third parties.
It is interesting to note that the two categories of employee we have
described—the lawsuit overreactive and the lawsuit underreactive—are not
mutually exclusive. Imagine a corporate manager who is deciding whether
to engage in activity that will generate $200 in profits for her corporation
but will impose a $100 cost on a third party. Imagine further that the
manager has $50 in personal wealth. As traditionally defined, this manager
is judgment proof: the liability the activity would generate ($100) exceeds
her personal wealth ($50). Yet from a social perspective the manager may
be overdeterred if she is held personally liable. The activity is socially
worthwhile, with benefits ($200) in excess of costs ($100). But the manger
might refrain from engaging in it because she stands to lose her $50 while
the $200 upside will go to her firm’s shareholders.
II. THE CIRCULARITY CRITIQUE OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
Many scholars agree that the compensation rationales for corporate
liability fail in the context of fraud-on-the-market lawsuits.26 In a typical
fraud-on-the-market case, a corporation’s managers have allegedly made
misleading statements that inflated the corporation’s stock price, and
investors who bought the overpriced stock on a public exchange sue the
corporation to recover their losses.27 Although the investors often sue the
responsible managers as well, the managers rarely pay anything. Instead,
the corporation or its insurer foots the bill.28

25

Employers can avoid harms caused by employees by screening them for carefulness, monitoring
them on the job and adjusting their pay and promotions accordingly, investing in safety measures, and
adjusting production levels. See supra Part I.B.1.
26
James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 328 (2009)
(“[M]ost scholars have concluded that securities-fraud actions are inherently unable to compensate
investors because of a circularity problem.”).
27
Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1312 (2008).
28
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1550 (2006) (observing that the corporate defendant and its
insurer typically advance the entire settlement amount).
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The critique of corporate liability in these actions begins with the
observation that diversified investors both buy and sell shares on the stock
market. They therefore are just as likely to benefit from fraud that inflates
stock prices as they are to be injured by it, and these gains and losses are
likely to net out over time.29 Thus, to the extent that most investors are
diversified, fraud-on-the-market class actions do not promote compensatory
goals, for the simple reason that diversified shareholders suffer no net loss
that requires compensation.
Shareholder diversification also undermines the deterrence rationale
As noted
for corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits.30
previously, the deterrence rationale posits that activity which imposes costs
on third parties will be curbed if those costs are shifted to parties in a better
position to prevent them. In a fraud-on-the-market suit, any possible
deterrence benefit would derive from the shifting of losses from the plaintiff
class of shareholders to the owners of the corporation whose agents
committed the fraud. This benefit will not arise, however, with respect to
diversified shareholders who over time are just as likely to be owners of the
defendant corporations as members of the plaintiff classes. Indeed, many
members of a plaintiff class may continue to be shareholders of the very
corporation they are suing.31 Corporate liability in such cases is, from the
perspective of diversified shareholders, mere pocket shifting. Since the
damages awards do not threaten diversified shareholders with the prospect
of a net loss, they do not have the deterrent effect normally attributed to
civil liability.32
29

This argument is traceable to Judge Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel’s seminal article,
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). See, e.g., Alicia Davis Evans,
The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225 (2007) (“[S]cholars . . . have used
Easterbrook and Fischel’s insight to decry the provision of securities fraud compensation as
inefficient . . . .”). While this is the prevailing view, and we adopt it here for purposes of analysis, we
note that it has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., id. at 229–34 (arguing that even diversified investors
may suffer net losses as a result of securities fraud if, for example, they are net purchasers of stock, or if
stock prices drop upon the revelation of fraud below where they would have traded without fraud); Park,
supra note 26 at 340–41 (arguing that diversification may not completely protect unsophisticated
investors from fraud losses if such losses are not randomly distributed but rather are concentrated on
corporate outsiders).
30
Because they are the most controversial, we focus on fraud-on-the-market class actions—that is,
fraud that affects the price at which stock trades amongst investors on the secondary market. But class
actions challenging primary market fraud—fraud that affects the price at which the issuer itself sells
shares—may also be attacked on circularity grounds if the issuer is owned by diversified shareholders
and the offering is likewise marketed to diversified shareholders. This would exclude IPOs but include
many primary offerings by seasoned issuers.
31
Cf. Coffee, supra note 28, at 1562 (“[E]nterprise liability in this context is a strategy akin to
punishing the victims of burglary for their failure to take greater precautions.”).
32
Although the out-of-pocket losses investors suffer from fraud on the market are perfectly offset
by other investors’ gains, such fraud nevertheless imposes well-recognized societal costs: it increases the
cost of capital for all firms and hence decreases economic efficiency. See Amanda M. Rose, The
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173,

1688

105:1679 (2011)

Intraportfolio Litigation

To be sure, the compensation and deterrence rationales for corporate
liability in fraud-on-the-market cases still have teeth with respect to
shareholders who are undiversified.33 But the mere presence of some
undiversified shareholders may not be sufficient to justify the lawsuit. This
is because the standard deterrence and compensation benefits seem to apply
only to undiversified shareholders. Therefore, these social benefits of the
litigation decrease as the degree of diversification increases. Meanwhile,
the social costs of litigation—lawyers’ fees, management distraction, and so
on—do not depend on the degree of shareholder diversification. As
diversification increases, the benefits of the lawsuit decline, but its costs
hold constant. At some point the value proposition must turn negative—
that is, unless there is some other benefit of the lawsuit that applies even to
the shareholders who over time tend to be on both sides of the “v.”
Thus, if you accept the basic premises of the circularity critique—i.e.,
that most shareholders are diversified and that diversified shareholders do
not suffer net out-of-pocket losses from fraud on the market—then all of
the classic justifications for corporate liability are called into question in
fraud-on-the-market cases.34 In Part IV we develop an alternative
justification: that corporate liability serves a portfolio governance function
by aligning the interests of managers with those of diversified shareholders.
We call this the “informational theory” of corporate liability. But before we
explore that theory and apply it to fraud-on-the-market suits in particular,
we consider the implications of shareholder diversification for corporate
liability more broadly.

2179–80 (2010). It therefore ought to be deterred. But the damages paid in fraud-on-the-market class
actions will not cause diversified shareholders to internalize these more-amorphous societal costs either
if the shareholders are just as likely to be members of the class receiving the damages payment as to be
owners of the defendant corporation making the payment.
33
Some scholars have argued that the compensation justifications for corporate liability fail even
with respect to undiversified shareholders because those investors could diversify if they so chose.
Diversification is a cheaper form of insurance against securities fraud than litigation. See Merritt B.
Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297,
309. If investors choose not to avail themselves of diversification’s advantages, the argument is that it
hardly seems right for the law to compensate them for their avoidable losses. See id.
34
Jill Fisch has argued that corporate liability is justified on behalf of informed traders, who tend to
be undiversified by necessity and who produce a positive externality by promoting capital market
efficiency. “If fraud increases the cost of providing this externality, [diversified shareholders] should
compensate traders for the resulting losses.” Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in
Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 347–48. We wonder whether this rationale
remains persuasive once the possibility of a direct lawsuit against the responsible agent is recognized.
See infra text accompanying note 55.
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III. EXTENDING THE CRITIQUE: THE SEEMING POINTLESSNESS OF
INTERCORPORATE LITIGATION IN A WORLD OF DIVERSIFIED
SHAREHOLDERS
Although there is an extensive academic literature exploring the
implications of shareholder diversification for securities fraud litigation,35
few scholars have considered its significance for corporate liability more
broadly. Yet there is nothing special about securities fraud litigation that
should limit the arguments against corporate liability to that context. To the
extent that shareholders are diversified, the same concerns call into question
the compensation and deterrence justifications for just about any lawsuit in
which one public firm sues another, regardless of whether the cause of
action is breach of contract, patent infringement, theft of trade secrets, or
some other legal wrong.36
To illustrate, imagine that Firm A and Firm B are both members of the
S&P 500,37 and that A sues B to collect damages for an injury that B
inflicted on A. Imagine further that 50% of the outstanding shares of each
company are owned by investors who also own proportionate equity stakes
in all other S&P 500 companies. This means that the shareholders of the
two companies overlap by 50%. For these overlapping shareholders the
lawsuit between A and B serves no compensatory function, as those
shareholders would effectively be paying damages to the same extent they
received them.38 Nor with respect to these overlapping shareholders does
the lawsuit serve the deterrence function traditionally attributed to corporate
liability. The shareholders of B who also own A have already internalized
the costs that B imposed on A before the lawsuit was brought. With respect
to these shareholders, the lawsuit creates no incentive to prevent the injury
that the shareholders did not possess already. To be sure, the lawsuit would
have the traditional compensation and deterrence benefits with respect to

35

See, e.g., supra notes 27–29, 33–34.
Robert Hansen and John Lott have observed that “[t]here are numerous economic settings where
one firm’s actions affect other firms’ values,” including a “supplier . . . withholding shipments after
customers have made sunk investments dependent on those shipments.” Robert G. Hansen & John R.
Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholders/Consumers,
31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 47 (1996).
37
The S&P 500 is an index of the 500 largest companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ. Many investors own S&P 500 index funds, which give the investor equity stakes in
all companies in the index. The index is capitalization weighted, meaning that it allocates value across
its 500 member companies based on the companies’ relative size as measured by their market
capitalization. See S&P 500, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l-- (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
38
We also note that the loss-spreading version of the compensation rationale for corporate liability
seems not to apply to firm-on-firm lawsuits as a general matter. There is no reason to think that the
plaintiff companies will usually have fewer shareholders than the defendant companies, or will be in a
worse position to purchase insurance. Therefore, the loss-spreading rationale seems to be limited to
suits in which the plaintiff is an individual or a small class rather than a public corporation.
36
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the shareholders who only own shares of one of the companies. But these
benefits may not be sufficient to justify the lawsuit from a social
perspective given that, as the amount of shareholder overlap increases, the
lawsuit’s traditional social benefits decrease but its costs stay constant.
The point at which the value proposition in firm-on-firm lawsuits turns
negative may be reached more often than one would expect. Hansen and
Lott have shown that many institutional investors—who own about 50% of
all corporate equity in the United States and over 75% of the shares of the
largest 1000 corporations39—approach full diversification within industries,
where firm-on-firm misconduct is most likely to occur.40 Moreover, a
growing number of shareholders hold broad-based index funds, thereby
approaching the ideal of the fully diversified investor.41
Parallel logic applies if we look at the matter in terms not of
shareholder overlap but rather of shareholder diversification across the
economy. Imagine a hypothetical economy with 101 firms. Assume that
each of the shareholders of one firm, XYZ Corp., own a proportionate equity
stake in twenty-five randomly selected other firms in the economy.42
39

Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
1963 (2010).
40
See Hansen & Lott, supra note 36, at 49–50, 49 tbl.1, 51 tbl.2 (reporting evidence of substantial
cross-ownership in the computer and automotive industries, and concluding that “[t]hese levels of crossownership clearly indicate that large numbers of important shareholders would benefit from having the
firms they own internalize externalities imposed on other firms”).
41
See INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 32–33 (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
2010_factbook.pdf (detailing the net inflow of capital into index funds since 1995).
42
The assumption that the shareholders own an equal, proportionate stake of all firms in their
portfolios is consistent with the widespread use of index funds, which typically own equal,
capitalization-weighted proportions of the equity of each of the firms in which they invest. The effects
of disproportionate equity holdings across portfolio firms can be modeled as follows:
Let P be the cost of Firm XYZ’s investment in a precaution to avoid an accident that, if it occurs,
will inflict costs on other firms in the economy (but not on XYZ). Let R be the percentage by which the
investment reduces the likelihood of the accident. Assume that all other firms in the economy have an
equal probability of suffering the costs of the accident. Let T be the total costs of the accident to all
firms if it occurs. On these assumptions, the socially efficient result is for Firm A to invest P whenever
P < RT.
Diversified share ownership complicates the analysis as follows. Let A be the percentage of Firm
XYZ’s equity owned by diversified shareholders. Let B be the percentage of the equity of all other firms
in the economy owned by these same diversified shareholders. These shareholders would want Firm
XYZ to invest P whenever AP < BRT. In this inequality, the left side represents the cost of the
investment to the diversified shareholders, and the right side represents the benefits. The inequality can
be rewritten (A/B)P < RT. It follows that when A = B, the diversified shareholders will have the socially
efficient incentive: they will want Firm XYZ to invest P when it is efficient to do so. In that case, firmon-firm litigation to redress the costs of the accident will have no deterrent effect with respect to these
diversified shareholders. If, however, A > B, then the shareholders’ interest will be for Firm XYZ to
underinvest in precautions because the shareholders internalize the costs of the investment more than
they reap the benefits. This would occur if the shareholders own a larger proportion of Firm XYZ’s
equity than they do the equity of the other firms in their portfolios, or if their portfolios do not include
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Imagine further that XYZ’s shareholders are deciding whether to cause XYZ
to invest in safety measures that would reduce the chances of an industrial
accident which, if it occurred, would injure some randomly selected group
of the other firms in the economy. On these assumptions, the shareholders
of XYZ would bear 100% of the costs of the safety measures but internalize
only 25% of the expected benefits. It follows that, to correct the
shareholders’ insufficient incentive to invest in precautions, we would only
need to empower a randomly selected group of seventy-five other firms to
sue XYZ for injury. If instead all 100 other firms in the economy enjoyed
the right to sue XYZ for any injuries they incurred (as would be true under
current law), then 25% of the suits brought against XYZ would serve no
deterrence or compensation function, as those suits would be brought to
redress harms whose costs and benefits the shareholders of XYZ had, in
expected value terms, already internalized. The litigation expenses for
those suits would be, from a social perspective, a deadweight loss. In
practice it would be difficult for lawmakers to determine ex ante which
potential intercorporate suits should be allowed and which should not. But
it remains true that as shareholder diversification increased (meaning here
that XYZ’s shareholders progressively added more firms to their portfolios),
the expected social benefits of intercorporate lawsuits in this economy
would decline, and eventually would fall below their costs. The general
right for firms to bring intercorporate lawsuits would then, in the absence of
other benefits from such litigation, do more harm than good.
We are not the first to recognize that the circularity critique of
securities fraud class actions can be directed against intercorporate litigation
generally. Randall Thomas and James Cox have observed that “well
diversified investors may own both Cisco and Northern Telecom,” and “[i]f
there was a patent infringement judgment won by Cisco against Northern
Telecom, this might be seen as yielding no net benefit to such a diversified
shareholder.”43 But Thomas and Cox go on to argue that such a lawsuit
would still be worthwhile because the circularity critique “fails to take into
account the value society gains by enforcing its laws, including the federal
securities laws.”44 Just what that value is, however, Thomas and Cox do not
specify. As explained above, intercorporate litigation fails to serve the
traditional compensation and deterrence functions of corporate liability to
the extent that the owners of the plaintiff and defendant overlap. In the next

all other firms in the economy. In that case, firm-on-firm litigation to redress the harm will serve a
(partial) deterrent effect for these diversified shareholders. Finally, if A < B, the diversified shareholders
will want Firm XYZ to overinvest in precautions. This will occur if the shareholders own a smaller
proportionate interest in Firm XYZ than they do in the other firms in their portfolios. In that case, firmon-firm litigation to redress the harm will exacerbate these shareholders’ incentive to encourage XYZ to
overinvest in precautions.
43
See Cox & Thomas, supra note 1.
44
Id. at 181.
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Part we identify a new justification for intercorporate litigation that, unlike
the traditional rationales, is valid even if we assume extensive shareholder
diversification. We thereby give Thomas and Cox’s essential intuition—
that firm-on-firm lawsuits must serve some purpose even for diversified
shareholders—a more solid theoretical footing. Whether our justification
can also support corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market class actions is a
separate question, to which we will return in Part V.
IV. A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY: THE
INFORMATIONAL THEORY
In this Part we seek to explain something that previous theories of
corporate liability cannot: why shareholders would be willing to pay for
litigation directed against themselves. Our argument has two parts. First,
we assume that diversified shareholders can use financial information about
their portfolio firms to evaluate and motivate the firms’ managers. Second,
we posit that litigation between portfolio firms can make firm-specific
financial information a better indicator of managers’ contributions to total
portfolio value. Unlike traditional justifications for corporate liability, our
theory takes into account that diversified shareholders already have the
incentive, even without corporate liability, to limit intraportfolio harms. As
a practical matter, however, diversified shareholders lack the means to act
on this incentive. Our argument is that litigation between portfolio firms—
litigation in which shareholders essentially sue themselves—can provide
those means.45
Our claim that firm-specific financial reports permit diversified
shareholders to evaluate and motivate managers has an analogue in the
academic literature on corporate groups. A corporate group is a set of legal
entities owned by a holding company that in turn has its own (typically
public) shareholders. From those shareholders’ perspective, all that matters
is the profits of the group as a whole. Yet the holding company’s senior
executives might treat the group’s various subsidiaries as profit centers that
each prepare their own financial statements.46 This profit-center system
permits the senior executives to delegate decisionmaking authority to
midlevel managers while retaining a means for holding those managers
accountable. And it creates a kind of managerial tournament in which
midlevel managers compete for pay and promotion by trying to maximize
the profits of their respective subsidiaries.

45

If the conduct giving rise to the injury also imposes costs on parties outside the portfolio, such as
consumers or (in the case of environmental harms) property owners, diversified shareholders will not
automatically internalize those costs. Our theory does not undermine the traditional rationales for
allowing third parties to recover against the employer in such situations.
46
Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499,
513 (1976).
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For a shareholder who owns a diversified portfolio, firm-specific
financial information can serve similar functions. Such a shareholder will
find it impractical to pay attention to day-to-day operations at all the firms
he owns. And even if he did pay attention, he rarely would own enough
shares in any particular firm to be able to influence its affairs. For these
reasons, the diversified shareholder will rationally delegate almost all
decisionmaking power to his firms’ managers. When such delegation
occurs, the publication of firm-specific financial data can help ensure that,
despite the high degree of delegation, managerial interests do not deviate
too far from those of shareholders. For example, many public firms link the
pay of their CEO and other top managers to the firm’s reported profits.47
Pay can be connected to profits through a contractual formula, or it can be
tied to the firm’s public share price, which will respond to earnings reports.
Managers will also be motivated by the fact that poor financial results may
induce shareholders to vote them from office or cause their firm to become
the target of a hostile takeover.
By motivating managers to maximize the profits of their respective
firms, diversified shareholders hope to maximize the value of their
portfolios as a whole. This hope would be frustrated, however, if the
portfolio firms could impose costs on each other with impunity.48 For
example, Firm A might renege on a promise to deliver supplies to Firm B
for use in B’s manufacturing process. In that case the cost of finding
another supplier would reduce B’s reported profits for a reason that may
have nothing to do with the competence of B’s managers. Because those
managers’ pay is tied to B’s financial results, the managers will want some
kind of adjustment, such as a compensatory payment from A to B to cover
the costs of the missed delivery. And shareholders who own both A and B
may also want A to make the compensatory payment, for otherwise A’s
reported profits would overstate, and B’s would understate, their
management teams’ respective contributions to overall shareholder wealth.
This is true even though the direct effect of the payment is merely to shift
wealth from one shareholder pocket to another.
In other words,
compensatory payments of this type would align management and
shareholder interests by forcing managers to consider the impact of their
actions on all firms in their shareholders’ portfolios.

47

See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions—Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 272 (1999) (noting the “substantial increase in the use of
stock options, performance-based bonuses and other forms of pay for performance” since the early
1990s).
48
As Robert Hansen and John Lott have observed, “If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and
if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want [share] value maximization
to be corporate policy” but rather “want companies to maximize portfolio values.” See Hansen & Lott,
supra note 36, at 43.
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The problem with such a voluntary system of compensatory payments
is that the managers responsible for an intraportfolio harm will resist
making the payment, as their own pay and job prospects are tied to their
firm’s profits, which the payment would reduce. To continue with the
earlier hypothetical, Firm A’s managers would likely refuse Firm B’s
demand for compensation, and if compelled to explain why might argue
that the promise to deliver was subject to a contingency that in fact arose.
In short, the two management teams would have an incentive to dispute
who is at fault and for how much. For this reason, a system of firm-to-firm
payments to compensate for intraportfolio harms is not one that the
managers themselves could be trusted to administer.
Similar problems could arise in a corporate group managed under the
profit-center system: one subsidiary could impose costs on another that
distort each profit center’s financial data, and the conflict of interests among
the respective management teams would make it difficult for them to agree
on a resolution. In that context, however, the management teams have a
common superior: the senior executive at the holding company. The
executive could be called upon to resolve disputes among subsidiary
managers, for example by setting transfer prices within the group that
reflect the actual cost to shareholders of the resources that the various
subsidiaries consume. In such ways, senior executives can fine-tune the
system to ensure that the interests of the subsidiaries’ managers do not
deviate too far from those of the group’s ultimate shareholders.
In the context of a diversified investment portfolio, by contrast, there
are no such overseers. While diversified shareholders have interests in both
parties to an intraportfolio dispute, their rational ignorance of firm-specific
affairs leaves them in a poor position to determine whether a compensatory
adjustment is warranted in any particular case. Thus, from a practical
perspective, the managers of public firms have no common superiors, even
if the firms themselves have common owners. The shareholders must rely
on someone else to sort out intraportfolio externalities and thereby protect
the informational value of firm-specific financial information.
An interesting question arises at this point: why is it that portfolio
firms lack common overseers? In other words, why do all public
companies not merge into one sprawling corporate group whose supersenior executive team could evaluate the performance of the constituent
entities’ managers on behalf of public investors? There are a variety of
potential answers to this question, including the obvious antitrust problems
that forming this conglomerate would entail. But perhaps the most
persuasive answer is that the super-senior executives, facing essentially no
competition themselves, would be tempted to place their own interests—
including their desire to perpetuate themselves in office—ahead of the
interests of investors. The wave of conglomerate bust-ups in the 1980s
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suggests that there is a point beyond which the principal–agent costs of
bringing multiple enterprises under common control exceed the benefits.49
In the absence, then, of economy-wide overlords, diversified
shareholders need some other mechanism for resolving intraportfolio
conflicts. One possibility would be for the shareholders to allow their
portfolio firms to bring lawsuits against the managers and employees of
other portfolio firms responsible for intraportfolio injuries. This would be
the most direct way to deter undesirable behavior by corporate agents, and
in some situations would be sufficient. However, the drawbacks we
mentioned earlier of direct actions against corporate agents do not go away
merely because the two firms involved have common shareholders. Direct
lawsuits against employees will still be an inadequate deterrent if the
employees are judgment proof.50 The employees also will be underdeterred
if they systematically underestimate risk or they think their role in
misconduct will be impossible for a plaintiff to prove.51 While diversified
investors would want their management teams to take cost-justified steps to
deter destructive behavior by these lawsuit-resistant employees, they cannot
trust the managers to do so on their own initiative given that the payoff
from investments in deterrence may not appear in the reported profits of the
managers’ own firms.
With corporate managers, who are likely to be wealthy, the primary
problem with personal liability is more likely to be overdeterrence than
underdeterrence. Personal liability might cause managers to refrain from
conduct that imposes costs on other portfolio firms but that nonetheless is
cost-justified from a shareholder perspective. An example would be a
decision by an oil executive to build an offshore rig that, if a spill occurs,
could damage a shrimp farm owned by another public firm. Despite this
risk, the oil rig might have a positive expected value to shareholders who
own both the oil firm and the shrimp-farming firm. Yet the executive might
decline to build the rig if the personal liability he expects to incur from oil
spills exceeds his share of the profits the rig would generate. Diversified
shareholders may not want to impose personal liability on the executive in
this situation. But in the absence of liability, his incentives will swing to
the other extreme: he will be like a judgment-proof employee who is
unimpressed by the prospect of a lawsuit against him. He might then build
a rig that has a negative expected value for diversified shareholders if by
doing so he could boost his own firm’s bottom line.

49

See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 444 n.4 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing how the
conglomerate mergers of the 1960s proved to be inefficient and led to the well-publicized bust-up
takeovers of the 1980s).
50
See supra Part I.B.1.
51
See supra Part I.B.1.
AND
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These drawbacks to personal liability mean that diversified
shareholders need some other device to prevent excessive intraportfolio
injuries. We propose that corporate liability can serve as this device.
Under our informational theory, diversified shareholders effectively
delegate to the court system the responsibility for authorizing compensatory
payments among portfolio firms, thereby correcting the distortions in those
firms’ financial data caused by intraportfolio injuries. The shareholders
themselves ultimately bear the costs of this system, as the attorneys’ fees
and other litigation expenses incurred by both parties to an intraportfolio
lawsuit reduce those parties’ net earnings. Unlike the damages award,
which is a mere shift of value from one shareholder pocket to another, these
legal expenses deplete the total value of the shareholders’ portfolio. Yet the
expenses may be outweighed by the informational benefits of the lawsuit,
which could cause financial data about each portfolio firm to better reflect
the contribution of that firm’s managers to overall portfolio wealth. As a
result, managers will be more likely to make decisions that maximize
portfolio value, including by investing in measures to prevent subordinates
from engaging in conduct that is not cost-justified from the perspective of
diversified shareholders.
There are multiple mechanisms by which a lawsuit could generate
information that influences manager behavior. The mere filing of the suit
may have an immediate impact on the firms’ respective stock prices if the
lawsuit is publicized and traders take into account the suit’s expected
impact on each firm’s bottom line. In addition, firms may be required
under standard accounting rules to take reserves against expected material
litigation losses, in which case the lawsuit may have a direct effect on
reported profits before the final judgment is entered and any damages are
paid. Conversely, firms could settle a matter privately if their managers
agree on how a court would likely rule and they do not wish to reduce their
respective profits by incurring attorney fees. In that case, the settlement
payment will have the effect of adjusting each firm’s reported earnings.
Unlike traditional justifications for intercorporate liability, which grow
weaker as the degree of shareholder diversification increases, the
justification we develop here grows stronger. Indeed, it is strongest if one
assumes a market dominated by fully diversified shareholders, from whose
perspective any litigation between publicly traded firms constitutes a
dispute between firms the investors own.52 But what about a market in
which shareholders are only partially diversified? In such a market, firmon-firm litigation is best understood as serving a hybrid deterrence function.
In line with traditional theory, intercorporate liability gives partially
52

If most investors were fully diversified, and hence there were fewer active traders, the
informational value of stock prices would fall. But intraportfolio litigation would still affect firms’
reported profits, which could serve the informational function we describe here to the extent that profits
were used in setting managers’ compensation.
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diversified shareholders the right incentives to prevent their agents from
imposing costs on firms not in their portfolio. At the same time, in line
with our informational theory, it provides the shareholders with the means
for ensuring that their agents act in ways that maximize portfolio value.
The relative importance of each function will depend on how broadly
investors are exposed to the market as a whole (or to a particular industry, if
firm-on-firm misconduct tends to be concentrated within industries).
We believe that the informational theory we have outlined here has the
potential to justify a wide range of lawsuits between firms with overlapping
owners. To summarize our analysis, the justification could apply to suits to
redress two types of intraportfolio harm. The first is harm caused by
corporate agents who are lawsuit-resistant. And the second is harm caused
by agents who are not lawsuit-resistant and who were engaged in conduct
that had the potential to increase the total value of the shareholders’
portfolio. Harms of this second type would include many contract
breaches, unintentional torts, and patent infringements (so long as the
infringement was inadvertent). As the oil executive example illustrated,
these harms are the inevitable byproduct of socially productive activity. In
other words, the optimal amount of these harms is, from a diversified
shareholder perspective, greater than zero. In order not to discourage the
activities altogether while at the same time ensuring that agents do not
ignore the activities’ intraportfolio costs, shareholders would rationally pay
for litigation that is ultimately directed against themselves.
In the next Part we consider whether the type of litigation that started
the circularity debate—securities fraud class actions against corporate
defendants—also can be justified by the information it generates.
V. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS REVISITED
We are now back at the point where we began this Essay: the debate
over whether the so-called circularity critique invalidates fraud-on-themarket lawsuits against corporate defendants. To review the bidding, the
debate started with commentators who noted that the diversified
shareholders that constitute the typical class members in such actions are
also the primary beneficiaries of securities fraud. The lawsuits thus seem to
serve no compensation or deterrence function; they just generate hefty fees
for lawyers. Rising to defend the status quo, Randall Thomas and James
Cox argued that the circularity critique proves too much, as it could apply
to any lawsuit between corporations owned by diversified shareholders.53
The shareholders who own the plaintiffs and defendants in such cases
typically overlap, and to that extent are merely suing themselves. Yet such

53

Cox & Thomas, supra note 1.
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lawsuits are justified, Thomas and Cox argue, because they “affirm[] an
important principle that underlies the right vindicated.”54
As the discussion to this point makes clear, we agree with Thomas and
Cox that the circularity critique casts a shadow on the legitimacy of any
lawsuit between firms owned by diversified shareholders. But we are not
convinced by the alternative justification for such lawsuits they offer: the
vindication of an (unspecified) principle that underlies the right to sue. We
think the relevant question is not whether there should be a right to sue per
se, but rather whether that right should apply not only against the
responsible individuals but also against their corporate employer. On that
question, Thomas and Cox’s argument provides no guidance.
In this Essay we have made our own attempt to identify a benefit of
corporate liability that applies even with respect to overlapping
shareholders. As we explained in Part IV, our informational theory
explains why shareholders would be willing to pay for a wide variety of
lawsuits that ultimately are directed at themselves. In particular, the theory
can justify intraportfolio suits seeking redress for harms caused by agents
who are either (1) lawsuit-resistant or (2) lawsuit-responsive and engaged in
activities that from a diversified shareholder’s perspective could be
overdeterred. Many lawsuits based on traditional common law causes of
action—including breach of contract, strict liability, and simple
negligence—often fall into these categories. In this way, the informational
theory puts a stop to the circularity bulldozer before it clears away the entire
field of firm-on-firm lawsuits.
The question we now reach is whether our informational theory also
can reanimate the securities fraud lawsuits that started the circularity debate
in the first place. We think the answer is likely to be no, for two reasons.
First, we think that personal liability is an effective deterrent for most types
of securities fraud. If the law is effective at disciplining agents directly,
there is no need for the indirect means we describe here, whereby corporate
liability disciplines agents through its impact on stock prices and reported
financial results. Second, even if this were untrue—meaning that personal
liability were not an effective deterrent—we still think that corporate
liability in fraud-on-the-market cases would not be justified by our
informational theory, because the marginal value of the information
generated by such cases is likely to be low. We discuss these reasons in
turn.
With respect to the effectiveness of personal liability, the first relevant
question is whether the corporate agents who commit fraud on the market
tend to be lawsuit-resistant. The answer is yes if the agents lack wealth and
thus are not deterred by the threat of a judgment for damages. This
description, while perhaps apt for some lower-level corporate employees,
54

Id.
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does not fit the corporate agents who stand in a position to defraud the
market. Most of these agents are high-ranking corporate officers and hence
are persons of means. They therefore should be adequately deterred by the
threat of personal monetary sanctions.55
To be sure, even wealthy corporate officers might be lawsuit-resistant,
at least some of the time. For example, Jennifer Arlen and William Carney
have explained that officers may be underdeterred by personal liability in a
“last period” situation, when telling the truth will cost them their job and
most of their wealth.56 But while this possibility argues against the
effectiveness of personal liability in last-period situations, it does not argue
for corporate liability as an alternative.57 Corporate liability would mitigate
the last-period problem if it encouraged boards to invest in measures to
prevent fraud on the market by lawsuit-resistant managers. But corporate
liability for last-period fraud is unlikely to have this effect because the
directors would typically stand to gain more from the fraud than they stand
to lose via corporate liability.58 A better solution to the last-period problem
would be to impose criminal sanctions severe enough that even officers
who are in extremis will heed them.59
A second theory of lawsuit-resistant corporate officers has been offered
by Donald Langevoort.60 Under his account, cognitive distortions such as
overoptimism and confirmation bias may lead lower-ranking employees to
skew the information they convey to officers, and they also may cause the
officers to publish falsely positive information notwithstanding the seeming
irrationality of doing so.61 We note that this theory of lawsuit resistance, if
correct, also does not support corporate liability: why should we expect
officers and board members to react rationally to the threat of monetary
sanctions for the corporation if we do not expect them to react rationally to
the much more salient threat of personal liability?
In analyzing the effectiveness of personal liability, the next question
we must consider is whether it will cause potential defendants to overreact.
Recall that there are situations in which personal liability for corporate

55

One might ask, if this is the case, why should we worry about the assignment of corporate
liability given the ability of firms to seek indemnity for corporate liability from responsible agents?
Besides the additional transaction costs associated with an indemnity action, there is reason to worry that
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agents might discourage conduct that enhances portfolio value.62 For
example, diversified shareholders sometimes are better off when one
portfolio firm breaches a contract with another, but the breach might not
occur if the responsible managers were responsible for paying the resultant
damages. Shareholders would prefer to immunize managers from personal
liability in such cases. Once the managers are immunized, however, their
incentives are “overcorrected”: they will commit even those breaches that
reduce portfolio value so long as doing so inflates their own firm’s profits.
In that situation, the imposition of corporate liability could help align the
managers’ interests with those of shareholders.
While this rationale for corporate liability may work with breach of
contract, it does not apply well to securities fraud, for the simple reason that
securities fraud is not the type of behavior that shareholders would want
corporate agents to undertake in measured amounts. To the contrary,
securities fraud debases the very financial data that the shareholders use to
evaluate and motivate those agents.
In other words, diversified
shareholders would not want management to run a cost–benefit analysis
when deciding whether to engage in securities fraud, because to the
shareholders there is no benefit. Securities fraud therefore is not the type of
conduct that can be overdeterred, at least in a way that justifies corporate
liability as an alternative to personal liability.
An objection at this point might be that our analysis ignores the very
real prospect of legal error—that is, the risk that securities fraud lawsuits
might be based on stock-price drops that managers did not foresee but that a
jury, with the benefit of hindsight, would nonetheless blame on malice.
This too could create an overdeterrence problem, as it could discourage
managers not only from making dishonest statements but also from making
statements they honestly believe to be true but that they cannot support with
exhaustive documentation.63 As a result, firms may overspend on
accountants, and they may withhold useful information they would
otherwise disclose. Put another way, while securities fraud per se has no
upside for shareholders, financial disclosures do, and a securities fraud
enforcement regime plagued by legal error will decrease both the quantity
and quality of published information.
While we agree that the possibility of legal error could motivate
diversified shareholders to shield their agents from personal liability for
fraud on the market, it does not follow that those same shareholders would
want to shift that liability to the corporation rather than abolish it entirely.
62

See supra Part I.B.2.
To be sure, the problem of legal error today is not as severe as it may have been in the past. See
Rose, supra note 32, at 2220 (“[C]ongressional and judicial reforms of Rule 10b-5 class actions—
including stricter pleading requirements, a statutory safe-harbor for forward-looking statements, a
discovery stay pending decision on a motion to dismiss, and the elimination of aiding-and-abetting
liability—now strongly discourage private plaintiffs from bringing marginal suits.”).
63

1701

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Legal error, after all, also undermines the informational value of corporate
liability. Thus, a better response would be to reform the enforcement
mechanism to increase the accuracy of securities fraud litigation targeted at
corporate officers.64
Although we suspect that personal liability is an adequate deterrent of
fraud on the market, our skepticism of corporate liability for such conduct
does not rest on that perception alone. There are also several reasons to
believe that the informational value of corporate liability in fraud-on-themarket lawsuits is likely to be low. As a result, corporate liability is
unlikely to be cost-justified in such cases even if, contrary to our arguments
above, securities fraud cannot be adequately deterred through personal
liability for responsible managers.
We have already identified one reason that fraud-on-the-market
lawsuits against corporations might have low informational value: a high
rate of legal error. But there are other important reasons as well, starting
with the method that courts use to calculate damages in such cases. In our
model of an intraportfolio lawsuit with high informational value, a
necessary assumption is that the suit causes the defendant firm’s reported
financial results to reflect the net impact of the agents’ conduct on portfolio
value—that is, the portfolio benefits minus the portfolio costs. But this
description does not fit fraud-on-the-market class actions, which seek to
punish misstatements that allegedly distorted the price of a stock trading on
a public exchange.65 When managers make false statements that inflate
their firm’s stock price, buyers of the stock suffer a loss but sellers receive a
windfall. And this upside, unlike the profits from (say) building a factory
that also pollutes, does not automatically show up in the financial data of
the managers’ firm. Nor, importantly, is the corporate defendant entitled as
a legal matter to claim credit for these “positive externalities” in the
calculation of damages, which are set to equal buyers’ out-of-pocket losses
without an offset for sellers’ gains. As a result, a securities fraud suit can
cause the defendant corporation’s financial results to understate the
contribution of the firm’s managers to overall portfolio wealth. The
consequence, as with other types of legal error that produce false positives
or excessive penalties, will be overdeterrence.
On the other hand, this distortion in a firm’s financial data will be
avoided if the judgment or settlement is covered by the firm’s litigation
insurance policy. But in that case the lawsuit may lack informational value
altogether because the full amount of the damages—not just those in excess
of the amount of net harm—is transferred from the books of the defendant
to those of the insurer. Indeed, corporate liability insurance undercuts the
informational value of any intraportfolio lawsuit that the insurance covers.
64
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This problem would be mitigated if insurers charged higher premiums to
firms with greater liability risk, as higher premiums would reduce those
firms’ reported profits. However, Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have found
that “there is not a large marginal difference between the . . . premiums paid
by a well-governed firm relative to a poorly-governed firm.”66 In a world of
diversified shareholders, money spent by corporations on liability insurance
may simply be another agency cost: a way for managers to shield their
equity-based pay from the impact of harms they visit upon other firms in
their shareholders’ portfolios.67
A third reason that the information generated by corporate liability in
fraud-on-the-market lawsuits seems to have little marginal value is that, in
most cases, the same information has already been brought to light through
other sources. Our informational theory applies to agent behavior that will
not be disciplined except through the information generated by a private
lawsuit against the agent’s employer. But most instances of securities fraud
are ferreted out not by someone who will bring a private lawsuit, but rather
by the media or another source.68 And the revelation of the fraud through
these alternative sources creates a reputational hit that typically reduces the
firm’s stock price by an amount several times larger than the firm’s
expected legal penalty.69 It follows that the marginal amount of new
information generated by a private lawsuit against the corporation is likely
to be extremely small, especially as compared to the lawsuit’s costs. In
combination, these features of fraud-on-the-market lawsuits appear to make
it highly unlikely that the marginal value of the information generated by
corporate liability—which we have defined to include both vicarious
liability and corporate indemnification of agents—is greater than the
considerable legal expenses and other costs that the lawsuits impose.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of corporate law are preoccupied (some might say they are
obsessed) with principal–agent conflict. How, the scholars perennially ask,
can lawmakers stop corporate managers from putting their own interests
ahead of the interests of shareholders? A long list of answers has been
66
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proposed, including imposing liability on corporate managers for breaching
fiduciary duties. To our knowledge, however, no one has given the answer
we offer here: make the corporation—and hence, within the constraints of
limited liability, its shareholders—legally answerable for the costs its
agents impose on other public corporations. Until now, corporate liability
has been seen as a device for compensating victims and, through cost
internalization, aligning shareholder interests with those of society. But
both of these justifications weaken as shareholders diversify their
investment portfolios and hence are more likely, at least in lawsuits
between public firms, to be paying the very damages they at the same time
are recovering. In other words, as shareholders become more diversified,
their incentive to limit the costs their agents impose on other public
corporations naturally grows. What diversified shareholders lack are costeffective means for reining in those agents. They need information, boiled
down to dollars and cents, about each management team’s contribution to
overall portfolio value.
Corporate liability can help provide this
information. Hence, corporate liability is valuable to shareholders in
situations where personal liability for managers and employees will not
solve principal–agent conflict, either because the agents will be deterred too
little by the threat of a direct lawsuit, or because they will be deterred too
much.
But what about the Goldilocks cases—the ones in which the deterrence
supplied by personal liability is neither too strong nor too weak, but “just
right”? In those cases, corporate liability appears to be unnecessary. And,
as we argue here, there is good reason to think that securities fraud lawsuits
are Goldilocks cases. Personal liability for securities fraud should serve as
an effective deterrent. And even if this is untrue, the information generated
by corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits is probably of
minimal value. For these reasons, corporate liability for fraud on the
market appears to be justified neither by traditional compensation and
deterrence rationales nor by the informational rationale we advance here.
Meanwhile, a wide variety of other potential firm-on-firm lawsuits—breach
of contract cases, tort cases based on negligence or strict liability, and so
on—are not cases in which personal liability for agents would generate the
right amount of deterrence. These are cases in which diversified
shareholders may be perfectly willing to allow their managers to bring
lawsuits that are, in essence, directed against the shareholders themselves.
Liability in those suits may be circular but it is nonetheless worthwhile. In
this way, our informational theory provides the first justification for
corporate liability that can distinguish between securities fraud class actions
and other types of intraportfolio lawsuits even when, in both contexts, the
same shareholders are standing behind the plaintiff and the defendant.
Yet, as corporate scholars will always remind us, principal–agent
conflict never entirely goes away; often it just changes form. Thus, it may
very well be true that corporate liability in intraportfolio lawsuits makes
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managers better agents. But we must not forget that it is the agents who
decide whether to bring the suits. And this decision too can be skewed by
conflicts of interest. For one thing, when managers decide to bring an
intraportfolio suit, they will not consider the litigation expenses that the
other corporation will incur even though diversified shareholders would
want them to. Additionally, if there is systematic bias in favor of plaintiffs
in a particular area of law, managers will exploit it by bringing suits in that
area in order to inflate their firms’ reported earnings, which again will be
contrary to diversified-shareholder interests. An unexplored area of
principal–agent conflict—and one that our informational theory brings into
focus—is the degree to which litigation between public firms is itself a
source of, and not just a solution to, agency costs.
It follows that a practical extension of our analysis would be to
consider how diversified shareholders might want to curb the discretion of
managers to bring suits against other public companies. In the extreme
case, shareholders might want to opt their firm out of a particular category
of intercorporate lawsuit altogether, reasoning that the information
generated by actions in that category does not justify the litigation costs.
Or, more modestly, shareholders might want to require that certain types of
intercorporate lawsuit be sent to arbitration rather than to court as a means
of reducing litigation expenses and avoiding perceived biases among judges
and juries. And shareholders might also want to impose a “loser pays” rule
for attorneys’ fees in order to force managers to take both parties’ litigation
expenses into consideration.
Although the litigation opt-out system we imagine here could be
implemented through charter amendments, this approach may be
impracticable since amendments require board consent.70 A better approach
might be to have opt-outs organized and enforced through public stock
exchanges. The exchanges could identify those firms that are majorityowned by diversified shareholders, and then those firms’ shareholders could
vote on proposals to curb or modify management’s power to bring various
types of intercorporate suits. The proposals might be structured to be
binding only with respect to litigation against other qualified firms on the
exchange whose own shareholders have adopted a matching litigation
restriction. Management resistance to the system would then be reduced
because no firm’s managers would be forced to disarm unilaterally.
Although the immediate beneficiaries of such an opt-out system would
be the diversified shareholders of the participating firms, we see a broader
public benefit as well. When shareholders are on both sides of a lawsuit,
their interests are largely aligned with those of society as a whole: they
want the litigation to proceed only if it is meritorious and can be prosecuted
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and adjudicated in a cost-effective manner. Therefore, if shareholders
decided to opt out of a particular category of lawsuit, send it to arbitration
rather than court, or change the rules for attorneys’ fees, their choice would
provide a powerful market signal about the efficiency of the legal regime
that the shareholders are modifying. In this way, an opt-out system would
serve as a discovery mechanism, providing information that lawmakers
could use to reform legal rules that apply to all litigants.
Obviously such an opt-out system would raise a multitude of issues
that we do not attempt to address here, and perhaps there are mechanisms
other than firm-on-firm litigation that diversified shareholders could use to
encourage managers to maximize portfolio wealth as opposed to the
reported profits of the managers’ own firms. What we can say with
confidence is, as shareholder diversification continues to increase, these
issues will be among the leading variations on the unremitting scholarly
theme of principal–agent conflict.
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